Anniversary of Operation Sindoor: Need for a Surgical Strike on Social Media Propaganda

Credit By: DR SIDDHARTHA GHOSH

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• 08 May 2026

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We must not be lax in attitude and should take every measure possible to ensure social media safety

Yesterday, India marked the first anniversary of Operation Sindoor, where the Indian military gave a befitting reply to terror. After operation Sindoor, many restrictions were imposed on Pakistani origin many social media handles across major platforms like Twitter, Instagram, Facebook and YouTube. These restrictions were imposed to curb fake news and neutralise Pakistan’s favouring narrative in India.

While the initial blocking was effective back then, recent analysis and observation reveal that those earlier banned social media accounts are re-accessible, opening a channel to indirectly influence Indian social media users. This shows inconsistent enforcement by the authorities, and it must be a reason to ponder.

We witness non-uniform social media control on various platforms where there is a partial ban on content, such as music, while every other content from the social media handle remains accessible. We see a worrying trend where major platforms, including Twitter, Instagram, Facebook and YouTube, continue to host live TV streams from Pakistani news channels and even some of the Pakistani entertainment content remains available.

It's noteworthy that official Pakistan government social media handles like PMO’s, Senate’s, its  national assembly’s and the foreign ministry remain accessible in India and must be halted as they have a history of directly fanning misinformation.

This can lead to the growth of fake accounts looking to influence Indian social media users. Many Pakistani fake profiles operating on Twitter and Facebook can pretend to be operating from India, often impersonating individuals, and can amplify narratives favouring Pakistan and manipulate engagement. Not just this, but monetisation of such social media content can effectively mean access to a regular stream of money from social media platforms such as Twitter, to individuals behind these accounts.

Its noteworthy that these social media handles acts as force multipliers for the Pakistani Propaganda dissemination machine in India. Social media posts of Kashmir origin on sensitive issues often receive rapid and disproportionate engagement from Pakistan-based and Pakistan-operated accounts. This exposes an already existing amplification network and active monitoring and use of the Indian digital space by Pakistan.

This social media strategy of Pakistan can also be used by them to identify specific Indian individuals with radicalised ideological leanings. The list of individuals liking, sharing and commenting can further build a list of future pawns acting on Pakistan’s behalf in Indian social media. Persistent communication to such social media handles can be taken further into Telegram, WhatsApp, Signal and even online gaming chat systems, effectively bypassing any formal restrictions.

This strategy of Pakistan was evident when in 2025, Gujarat Anti-Terrorism Squad arrested four individuals distributing, circulating and promoting jihadi content through inflammatory videos, fatwas and calls for an armed rebellion under their banner of “Ghazwa-e-Hind”. Not just this, but their social media posts also included messages against Indian democracy and state institutions.

Another recent example can be a video posted by Itlija Mufti on Facebook and Twitter that crossed one million views. A Significant portion of comments on that video can be traced to Pakistan-based accounts. The comments section also shows a coordinated amplification where there are simulated likes and reactions on few posts.

The concern for such incidents is that such posts act as “aggregation points” where local users can engage organically. Also, these posts can further funnel terrorist activities in India even if 5-10 individuals can be radicalised from a social media post receiving thousands of likes in social media platforms such as Facebook or Instagram. Such micro-targeted content is thus harmful and needs to be analysed and banned in real time to protect the Indian masses.

At multiple occasions, old inflammatory content, such as that from Syed Ali Shah Geelani have been posted by these Pakistan-origin social media handles to attract high emotional engagement. Individuals commenting or sharing such content become visible nodes and are further identified, profiled and approached by anti-state institutions.

During the 2025 Hazratbal Shrine incident, where a Mob vandalizes the National Emblem, the video of the ghastly act was widely shared by Pakistan-origin accounts, and an increased local engagement was observed from Kashmir-based users.

To counter this, a real-time heat map of external amplifications, along with local participation, should be made and monitored digitally. Also, identifiable clusters of users aligned to such radical content should be made and monitored.

Further identification of these users’ needs needs to be done who actively engage and share such content. If not done in a time-bound manner, these individuals can become soft targets for influence operations while also serving as entry points for ideological shaping or recruitment by Pakistan.

Also, the structural gap of the continued banning of identified social media handles peddling Anti-India content should be addressed immediately. A real-time tracking system, along with a deterrence mechanism for high-risk digital behaviours, should also be installed swiftly. Not just this, but social media platforms should also be told sternly by the government to not just coordinate but also abide by measures suggested to them from time to time.

The government must consider forming a regular monthly or even fortnightly audit mechanism of reviewing if the restricted accounts remain restricted, and if identified restricted media content remains inaccessible in India. In case a previously banned account has been reactivated, immediate re-blocking of such entities should be ensured. An engagement-based monitoring of posts involving media, maps, foreign interaction and increased local participation must be monitored.

A cyber call intervention team can implement a deterrence mechanism after identifying individuals with a history of repeated engagement with sensitive content. Also, advisories and warning mechanisms through local police units can identify early-stage intervention and further reduce susceptibility of external influence inside India. An enhanced tracking of communication applications such as Telegram, WhatsApp and even gaming-based communication should be done by the agencies.

We must not be lax in attitude and should take every measure possible to ensure social media safety, since we know that Operation Sindoor was never called off, and the government of India has made this amply clear that a second phase of the same will be done as and when needed.

(The Author is the Director of Red Lantern Analytica. Twitter Handle: https://x.com/RLAnalytica)